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Abstract
In response to challenges to moral philosophy presented by other disciplines and 
facing a diversity of approaches to the foundation and focus of morality, this paper 
argues for a pluralist meta-ethics that is methodologically hierarchical and guided by 
the principle of subsidiarity. Inspired by Deweyan pragmatism, this novel and original 
application of the subsidiarity principle and the related methodological proposal for a 
cascading meta-ethical architecture offer a “dirty” and instrumentalist understanding 
of meta-ethics that promises to work, not only in moral philosophy but also in the 
(rest of the) real world, and that facilitates collaboration with other disciplines outside 
moral philosophy.
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1 Introduction
Anyone who aims to engage with moral philosophy in an interdisciplinary way 
is confronted with at least the following tensions or challenges when it comes 
to meta-ethical orientations and foundations, that is, approaches concerning 
what morality is, what moral sentences mean, and what the foundation of 
morality is, rather than normative questions, judgements, and theories about 
what is moral. Or, to put it in a language that takes into account the linguistic 
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turn in 20th century philosophy: If meta-ethics is what Gewirth (1968) called 
a ‘second-order’ discourse about first-order moral discourse, then what are the 
problems for participants in that discourse who wish to talk to people from 
other disciplines inside and outside philosophy?
First, there are challenges that are often seen as external to moral philoso-
phy proper when it comes to their source and nature. On the one hand, there is 
the naturalist – moralist tension, with the naturalist challenge coming from the 
natural sciences, cognitive sciences, and engineering departments. “Why do 
you, moral philosopher, still care about reasons, free will, etc. if neuroscience 
shows x, y, and z.? And why hang on to your human nature if machines can 
also reason, or if machines can replace reasoning by statistical calculation?” 
In response, it seems that philosophers can go either the naturalist direction, 
as for example Daniel Dennett does, or stubbornly insist on a Kantian view, 
stressing the special status of moral reasons, moral obligations, etc.
On the other hand, there are challenges coming from the humanities and 
social science departments (including philosophy departments but also liter-
ature and politics departs for example), in particular those where postmodern 
and posthumanist thinking tend to flourish. “Why do you ask questions con-
cerning individual morality and reasons if what really counts are political injus-
tices and exclusions on the basis of identity? Why continue within a tradition 
of white men thinking about the moral science of ‘man’? And how arrogant 
of you to focus on humans alone; you are excluding other entities!” Here we 
see also two responses that seem equally mutually exclusive: many (analytic) 
philosophers choose simply to ignore these directions of thinking and exclude 
them from the domain of moral philosophy, whereas others (usually so-called 
continental philosophers) embrace them, but often without looking back at 
mainstream moral philosophy, which is still discussing Hume and Kant.
Second, internally, that is, within moral philosophy itself, there are various 
kinds of meta-ethical approaches. For example, there are tensions between 
Humean and Kantian views of the foundation of morality. Here too philoso-
phers tend to safely keep to their own particular moral-philosophical tradition. 
When dealing with a moral problem in an interdisciplinary context, then, one 
typically starts from a particular moral-philosophical tradition and applies this 
to the problem at hand. For example, one starts from virtue ethics and the 
applies this to animals or robots.
But are there other ways to deal with these challenges? How can interdisci-
plinary moral philosophers get out of these deadlocks?
One way is to come down on one approach and in a sophisticated way try to 
deal with the challenges coming from the “other” side. For example, compatibi-
list responses to the question of free will do this to the extent that they respond 
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to natural sciences while hanging on to the notion of free will. Daniel Dennett 
is a good example here: as a philosopher and cognitive scientist, he argues that 
we have free will, but this free will is given by our evolved minds (Dennett 
2003) and chance, next to deliberation, plays a role in decision-making 
processes. And some moral philosophers at least discuss theories of justice in 
a way that takes into account for instance postmodern feminist theory and 
the social sciences. For example, one could understand the work of Martha 
Nussbaum as being connected to several of these directions: the capability 
approach she developed with Amartya Sen is connected to several moral theo-
ries and social sciences, and Nussbaum’s work on justice (e.g. Nussbaum 2006) 
seems to combine Humean elements (e.g. moral sentiment, imagination) and 
other, for example feminist, intuitions (e.g. about race and gender) – although 
the relation between these different theoretical directions is hardly theorized. 
All these attempts at connection and compatibility are admirable from the 
perspective of interdisciplinary moral philosophy.
But there is also another way of dealing with this variety of meta-ethical 
and interdisciplinary directions: a pluralist approach. But what is this? What 
does it mean with regard to meta-ethics? Does it mean that we have a choice 
between the different approaches? Does it mean that all of them are applied, 
and if so, how does that work?
This paper explores what a pluralist approach could mean. In particular, I 
argue for a pluralist meta-ethics guided by the subsidiarity principle.
First I outline three approaches to the foundation and core of morality: a 
naturalist one that has its roots in Hume, a rationalist one that has its root 
in Kant, and a poststructuralist and postmodern one that politicizes morality. 
The naturalist and postmodernist approaches question the boundaries (and 
hence the internal/external line) drawn by the rationalist, Kantian approach to 
morality. Then I argue for a pluralist approach that, roughly inspired by Dewey, 
further deconstructs the external/internal distinction and encompasses all 
three approaches, but involves a specific sequences and hierarchy justified by 
the principle of subsidiarity, here used as a meta-ethical principle. Influenced 
by Dewey, I argue that this can guide meta-ethical reflections by (interdiscipli-
nary) moral philosophers but that it may also have some use in actually dealing 
with moral problems. I conclude that this is precisely the purpose: we need an 
instrumental, “dirty” meta-ethics that is not purified from moral experience.
Next to relying on the subsidiarity principle and on Deweyan thinking to 
support my argument, I also use and critically treat technological and naturalist 
metaphors such as algorithm and cascade in order to show the import of my 
claims. I also reflect on the role of language in my conclusion. Furthermore, in 
terms of literature references, my focus will be on contemporary literature that 
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engages with Dewey’s ethics, in so far that this literature helps me to argue for 
the meta-ethical methodology I propose. It is not my purpose to present an exe-
gesis of Dewey’s ethics, let alone that the scope of the paper would allow for a 
more comprehensive presentation or substantial engagement with the Humean, 
Kantian, and postmodern approaches summarized in the first part of the paper.
2 Three Approaches to the Foundation and Nature of Morality
With regard to the question concerning the foundation and focus point of 
morality, we may broadly distinguish between three approaches: two mod-
ern, mainstream and one more recent, postmodern. I am aware that my brief 
summaries cannot do full justice to these approaches and to the variety within 
these approaches, the description of which remains at a very general level, but 
my purpose is to set us up for the main argument of the paper.
Naturalizing and psychologizing morality. A first approach, which ranges 
from Hume’s theory of moral sentiments to today’s attempts to combine moral 
theory and neuroscience, naturalizes and psychologizes morality. The idea is 
that our feelings and imagination, our capacity for empathy, our tendency to 
cooperate with others, and other natural, social, and cognitive capacities of 
human beings are the best basis for morality, since unlike reasons, they are 
truly motivating us to act in moral ways. This approach is rooted in an optimis-
tic view of human nature and morality.
Often this approach is traced back to the work of David Hume. Against 
Hobbes, who thought that human nature, if unrestrained, leads to a violent 
state, Hume thinks that in a state of nature there would be both cooperation 
and self-interest.
Responding to the discussions of his time but also in line with Aristotle’s 
grounding of virtue and eudaimonia in human nature, Hume thought that 
morality is derived from what he called the ‘moral sentiments’: feelings of 
approval and disapproval. The foundation of our moral norms lies in these 
natural-social sentiments. We evaluate other persons and their character 
(virtue) by means of moral sentiments, we feel approval. We also see advan-
tage for others. And we can exercise ‘sympathy’ towards strangers: we can feel 
enjoyment when a trait is beneficial or agreeable. Hume writes in An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) that what ‘pronounces characters and 
actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable’ depends in the final 
instance ‘on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal 
in the whole species.’ (Hume 1751, 173) He emphasizes our shared humanity 
and in particular ‘the human heart’, the ‘affection of humanity’ (272–273).
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Note that a Humean approach does not exclude rational considerations: 
according to Hume, correction is sometimes necessary by rational considera-
tions. And in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith added the 
idea of the impartial spectator to the moral sentimentalism tradition: individ-
uals can examine their own conduct by imagining looking at themselves from 
an objective, outside point of view. But sympathetic sentiments remain the 
focus and source of morality.
From a social psychology point of view, one could also add habits here that, 
in order to make people more moral, we could stimulate not only the moral 
sentiments and imagination, but also train good habits. This could not only 
be related to Dewey (see below) but also to sociological work, in particular 
Bourdieu, who has a lot to say about habits as a nexus between the individual 
and society.
In general, this approach to what morality is, is compatible with the natural 
and social sciences. Philosophers such as Dennett who offer a naturalist under-
standing of traditional moral and other concepts such as free will and con-
sciousness may have specific problems of giving a particular account, but they 
do not have a problem in principle with taking on this kind of project, given the 
openness for empirical work that is already built into this approach. As Hume 
puts it: philosophers should ‘reject every system of ethics, however subtle or 
ingenious, which is not founded on fact and observation.’ (Hume 1751, 175)
Rationalizing morality. A second approach, often rooted in Kant but also 
extending to other modern normative theories such as consequentialism and 
rationalistic interpretations of virtue ethics, views morality as independent 
from human nature and sociality – or at least from its empirical dimensions. 
Socrates already argued in the Republic that there are independent moral 
standards. In its Kantian version, this approach insists that morality is a realm 
that is and should be kept separate and unpolluted by empirical claims about 
human nature or about the functioning about our brains, biology, and so on. It 
seeks a foundation in reasons, principles, and/or moral obligations that stand 
apart from whatever may be the case about human beings and human socie-
ties. Normative theories in ethics and political philosophy, such as theories of 
justice, should guide our behaviour. This approach is pessimistic about human 
nature and morality: left unguided, people will not do the right thing. We bet-
ter provide them with categorical obligations or reliable methods of moral 
calculation.
Here, too, morality is based upon a single foundation: rationality. Moreover, 
often philosophers in this Kantian tradition argue that what they are dealing 
with is morality strictly speaking; the Humean approach is too much about 
“is” and too little about “ought” (as they understand it). Whatever else is in 
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our human nature and whatever other capacities we may have as biological 
human beings, we have reason and rational capacities and these and these 
alone should form the basis of morality. The rest is not moral but natural or 
pragmatic. Morality is thus rationalized.
Its focus on the metaphysical exclusivity and transcendence of morality 
renders this approach far less compatible with the natural and social sciences 
(except perhaps logic and very formal approaches), since it reserves (occupies) 
the terms “moral” and “morality” for a special domain (their domain) that is 
seen as clearly distinguished from the non-moral, naturalist and pragmatic 
domain. There is a world of moral reasons, moral principles, moral theories, etc. 
and there is a natural world, and both worlds do not really meet. Naturalistic 
explanations, according to this view, are not relevant at all to morality strictly 
speaking. Kant thought that moral philosophy must be concerned with a priori 
moral principles and their foundation: fundamental issues of morality must 
be addressed ‘without drawing on observations of human beings and their 
behaviour’ (Johnson and Cureton 2016). Morality concerns human beings only 
in so far as they are rational agents in an intelligible world; they then cause 
things in the sensible world and moral principles make demands on human 
psychology and social interactions, but morality is about that rational will and 
its principles.
In the Groundwork, for example, Kant acknowledges that ethics has an 
empirical part (which he calls practical anthropology) but he is concerned 
with the rational part which ‘could properly be called morals.’ (Kant 1785, 4) 
His metaphysics of morals must therefore be ‘carefully cleansed of everything 
empirical.’ (4–5) In contrast to Hume, he asserts that the ground of moral obli-
gation does not lie ‘in the nature of the human being or the circumstances of 
the world in which he is placed, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason’; 
moral philosophy rests on that pure part (5).
Politicizing morality. A third approach, emerging in poststructuralist, con-
structivist, and postmodern thinking (and perhaps originally based on Marx 
and Nietzsche), present in Foucault (e.g. 1980), Deleuze, etc., thriving in 
contemporary feminism, and connecting to the social and cultural sciences, 
questions the universal human nature and the universality of morality presup-
posed in the other approaches. It calls attention to differences, identity, and 
power. The moral question here does not only concern what to do and how to 
justify what to do, but also and mainly who asks whom to do what. Who is the 
moral subject and who is subjected? Who are the moral agents and patients? 
Who is exercising power over whom? Moreover, posthumanists (including 
feminist posthumanists such as Haraway (e.g. 1991) and Braidotti) have ques-
tioned what they see as the anthropocentric bias of the other approaches: they 
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argue that the “who” also includes non-humans and that modern approaches 
to morality have unjustly excluded animals and perhaps even (some?) tech-
nologies from the moral realm. This approach thus does not psychologize or 
rationalize morality but politicizes it.
Here the question is not whether morality must be founded upon sentiment 
(or more generally natural capacities) or rationality, but rather about whose 
sentiment and rationality this is and to whom or what it is applied. It takes 
seriously’ Thrasymachus’s argument in Plato’s Republic (1953) that morality is 
about power, while diverging on the normative implications of this insight. For 
example, Nietzsche connected morality to the will to power, but that does not 
mean that contemporary postmodern feminism therefore accepts the current 
power distribution(s).
Again philosophers working within the second, Kantian approach will try 
to dismiss this approach as having little or nothing to do with morality strictly 
speaking; instead, they will argue, it is about politics, identity, power, and so 
on. Moreover, this third approach is compatible with the social sciences but 
not necessarily with the natural sciences, whose methodologies tend to lack 
room for more constructivist and postmodern epistemologies. If one chooses 
this third approach, it may become difficult to talk to natural scientists and 
engineers, for instance.
3 A Pluralist Meta-Approach, Inspired by Dewey
But do we have to choose? As suggested in my introduction, usually meta-eth-
ical discussions are limited to conflicts between two approaches, for exam-
ple between Humean and Kantian approaches or between universal theories 
of justice and identity-oriented approaches to justice. More generally, the 
meta-ethical problem seems to be described as a choice between the three 
approaches: which approach to choose? But what happens if we embrace a 
pluralist meta-ethical view, which encompasses all three approaches? What 
does that mean?
If applied at all, pluralism is usually employed at the level of normative 
moral theories. The source of inspiration from the history of moral philosophy 
is John Dewey, who argued in ‘Three Independent Factors in Morals’ (1930) 
that good, duty, and virtue all connect to moral experience. Dewey argued 
against the reductionism and one-sidedness of teleological, deontological, and 
virtue theories. Tensions between them cannot be resolved in theory but must 
be resolved in a particular situation, in which one of the factors will turn out 
to be relevant. The answer to the question whether we must choose between 
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theories is then: we don’t have to, and should not, choose on beforehand. All 
depends on the situation. As Pappas (2008) puts it when clarifying the norma-
tive standpoint of pragmatism: ‘the normative issue is about how one should 
interact in moral situations’, that is, the inquiry ‘starts from where we are’ (71). 
Dewey’s normative theory does not start from an Archimedian or God’s-eye 
point of view.
Dewey’s argument is about moral theory. But we could also apply plural-
ism to meta-ethics and the approaches outlined, keeping in mind another 
Deweyan interest: the aim to sketch a meta-ethics that actually functions and 
does somehow justice to human moral experience. Moreover, it would be great 
if we do not just say “there is a truth in all three approaches and we should 
apply all of them” but if we can spell out some kind of relation between the 
approaches in a way that gives us some more meta-ethical guidance.
4 Proposal for a Meta-Ethical Safety Architecture Based on the 
Principle of Subsidiarity
Main argument. My intuition is that this can be done if we treat the approaches 
as steps in a kind of meta-ethical safety architecture: first we should try the first 
approach, if that doesn’t work then the second approach, and if that in turn 
fails we should turn to the third approach. In meta-ethical practice this could 
mean, for example, that we follow this sequence or cascade: first we hope that 
people will sympathize with one another and cooperate, if that doesn’t work 
we have to argue with them and use some normative principles and theories for 
this purpose, and if that fails we need to examine and change the underlying 
power structures that render natural sympathy and moral reasoning powerless 
by already excluding people and other entities before the moral reasoning or 
sympathy can even start off. I sense that this sequential way of thinking does 
not only represent some developments in the actual history of modern moral 
philosophy, but can also give us some practical guidance with regard to the role 
of morality in society by giving us a kind of meta-level algorithm for dealing 
with moral problems as philosophers (and perhaps even as moral agents and 
citizens).
How can this intuition be supported? I draw on two sources: one is political 
theory and another is American pragmatism.
For a start, I propose that we rely on a principle that is usually employed 
in a specific area of political thinking but deserves a much wider application 
in meta-ethics and normative thinking in general: the principle of subsidiarity. 
Usually the subsidiarity principle is meant to regulate political organization, 
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most often the political organization within a nation state. It holds that polit-
ical issues should be dealt with at the level at which the issues can (best) be 
resolved. For example, Føllesdal (1998) defines the principle as follows:
‘The “principle of subsidiarity” regulates authority within a political 
order, directing that powers or tasks should rest with the lower-level 
sub-units of that order unless allocating them to a higher-level central 
unit would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in 
achieving them.’ (Føllesdal 1998, 190)
For example, the subsidiarity principle is applied in the European Union, where 
it is meant to regulate tensions between centralization and decentralization. 
The principle has also been applied to legal issues (for example in interna-
tional human rights law) and even in cybernetics, where it means that prob-
lems are best solved in the subsystem where they arise, without reference to a 
higher authority. But what happens if we apply the principle in meta-ethics? 
What does the principle mean in that context?
Applied to the problem at hand – which meta-ethical approach to choose – 
subsidiarity could mean that we end up with the following methodological 
hierarchy, in which the different approaches I outlined function as different 
levels of moral analysis. First we have to explore if a moral problem can be 
solved by means of the exercise of natural capacities such as sympathy and 
cooperation, and see if that works. If not, then we have to move to higher 
level: rational morality. But this in turn may fail; in order to preserve “moral 
safety”, we then have to perform a deconstructive operation that questions the 
deepest presuppositions of our moral systems: who are the moral agents and 
patients? In principle, subsidiarity could also mean that we start with one of 
the other levels: the point is that the problem gets solved. What matters is com-
parative effectivity and efficiency. Hence the proposed hierarchy is not fixed; 
it is changeable if it turns out that another approach is more effective and effi-
cient. However, since higher levels of abstraction are more remote from moral 
experience, it is more likely that people will start at the most “local” level of 
abstraction, with “local” meaning here: close to moral experience and enabling 
the exercise of natural capacities.
For example, faced with the question whether robots have rights (see for 
example Gunkel 2017; Coeckelbergh 2010), we could first look at a naturalist 
and social science account of human-robot interaction, which can teach us 
something about how humans behave towards robots. If this fails to solve the 
problem, since as it turns out people respond very different to robots (some act 
as if robots are human beings or animals and exercise empathy towards them, 
coeckelbergh
Contemporary Pragmatism 18 (2021) 18-35Heruntergeladen von Brill.com06/01/2021 11:31:48AM
via free access
27
whereas others treat them as machines), we have to reflect on these responses 
and in the end have to rely on a normative theory of obligation and moral 
standing, but then we soon find out that such theories are based on properties, 
which raises epistemological problems among others (Coeckelbergh 2012), 
and for instance Kantian theory is anthropocentric. Does this do enough jus-
tice to the moral experience of interacting with robots? Reflecting on this may 
push us to the next level, which enables us to question that anthropocentrism 
and the related power relations, leading to a politicization of the question 
and potentially to a total deconstruction and change of the initial question. 
The inquiry is thus, methodologically and hence meta-ethically speaking, the 
result of a kind of moral cascading through different meta-ethical approaches. 
In fact, this is in part what Gunkel and I do in our work on moral standing 
in robot ethics, since our initially normative moral question about the moral 
standing of robots turns into a meta-ethical inquiry when we ask fundamen-
tal questions concerning how humans deal with moral standing and with 
other human beings, and what we mean by rights in our society. The proposed 
meta-ethical method makes sense of this and provides also guidance for other 
cases.
Further support for my argument that we best start with the naturalist and 
social explanations (and, practically, the exercise of the relevant capacities), 
is that proceeding like this this seems closest to what Dewey scholars such as 
Fesmire (2019; 2003) and Pappas (2008) call “moral experience” and “respond-
ing to the demands of the situation.” Let me elaborate how Deweyan pragma-
tism lends support to the proposed meta-ethical methodology.
My proposal takes inspiration from pragmatism and strengthens its argu-
ment since – in line with Dewey’s pragmatism – it is geared at meeting the 
demands of the situation (Fesmire 2019). Like Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, 
pragmatists view morality as a way to solve problems we face in society; 
this contrasts with Socrates’s position that there are independent and eter-
nal standards for moral judgment and of course with Kantian ethics. Dewey 
introduced a situational ethic, which starts with the situation and relies on 
moral experience. But here I add a particular cascading method: Faced with 
a particular moral challenge and using the principle of subsidiarity, the moral 
philosopher and, ultimately, the moral agent in the situation, will first explore 
if the problem can be solved by relying on capacities such as sympathy and 
cooperation. If this “local” solution works, then fine. However, if the demands 
of the situation are such that a solution can only be found if a moral frame-
work of obligations, demands for justice, etc. is applied, then the philosopher 
or moral agent/decision-maker will move to that level. If this still does not ena-
ble a satisfactory solution, a higher-level discussion about power for instance 
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or the boundaries of the moral community may be necessary. The cascade (or 
progression, if you wish) thus starts with what is closest to the moral experi-
ence of “ordinary” moral agents and then moves up to different and higher lev-
els of abstraction. The subsidiarity principle is thus employed in this way, and 
the cascading architecture or hierarchy is set up in this way, in order to keep 
meta-ethics as close as possible to moral experience of the situation, in which 
we have specific morally relevant feelings and already respond in morally rel-
evant ways using natural and social capacities such as empathy or sympathy, 
before other tools such as moral reasoning and postmodern theory can kick in. 
If this is the most effective and efficient way to deal with the moral problems 
we face, so the proposed meta-ethical subsidiarity principles says, then this is 
where our focus should be.
This way of working fits with what Anderson (2018) identifies as the natural-
ism in Dewey, and with the role Dewey believes imagination plays in moral rea-
soning (Fesmire 2003) – both of which connect back to Hume. Dewey would 
not reject reasoning, rationality, theory, and so on, but would stress that these 
are tools that help us to come with the morally difficult situation. Furthermore, 
a Deweyan approach has the additional advantage that it tends to work with 
the social sciences and the political interest of postmodern theory, for example 
if we consider the topic of habits, a concept used by Dewey but at least since 
Bourdieu also present in the social science, or the claims Dewey made about 
democracy, which may be of interest to those who want to perform decon-
struction on this, e.g. if one wishes to ask where Dewey draws the boundaries 
of political membership. The proposed hierarchy and application of the sub-
sidiarity principle in a way that starts from naturalist orientations, can thus be 
seen as constituting an implementation of Deweyan meta-ethical intuitions.
Response to potential objections and further discussion. One may object that 
the application of the meta-ethical framework to the moral agent or moral 
decision-maker confuses meta-ethics with making moral choices and applying 
normative moral theory. Meta-ethics, as understood in the analytic tradition 
at least, is not supposed to “work” at all. It is supposed to be a highly abstract 
reflection on the nature and foundation of morality. All the rest are external 
and empirical matters. But from a pragmatist, non-foundationalist perspec-
tive, this distinction must be deconstructed: a meta-ethics must be relevant 
to the making of moral choices. It is not supposed to be divorced from moral 
experience. Meta-ethics, like moral theory, does not give us transcendent 
authoritative criteria but tools that are supposed to work in practice. It corre-
sponds to the idea of a Deweyan ‘reflective’ morality that is not only naturalist 
but also non-authoritarian and is able to adapt to change (Anderson 2018). 
Moreover, Dewey’s idea was that morality is not just a question of individual 
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reasoners; instead, we have to pursue the moral inquiry together as we try to 
solve the problems we face. Applied to the meta-ethical framework at hand, 
this means that it is not meant for individual philosophers or citizens, but has 
to prove its usefulness as a tool in a democratic setting. In the end, whether it 
is a good idea to have such a cascading (or progressing) morality framework 
as a meta-ethical algorithm guided by the subsidiarity principle, is a matter of 
experimentation.
Furthermore, because of the openings to naturalism and constructivism, 
movements towards collaboration with natural or social scientists are also 
no longer seen as involving an operation to deal with “external” elements. 
This distinction between internal and external, too, needs to be deconstructed. 
So-called “empirical” matters are to be seen as entirely internal to the business 
of morality in so far as they have to do with the features of the moral situation 
and moral experience, which can be described with the help of the natural and 
moral sciences and – if these theories are needed at all – can be picked up by 
means of Humean sentiment and imagination or postmodern sensitivities to 
differences, for example.
Is this position sufficiently supported now? For moral philosophy faced with 
societal issues and, more generally, with interdisciplinary challenges, the proof 
of the pudding is in the eating. Whether the proposed meta-ethics works as a 
framework that can help moral philosophers respond to the challenges coming 
from other disciplines, depends not on theory but indeed on whether it works, 
that is, on what it can do to deal with these issues. For example, to the natu-
ralist challenges coming from the neurosciences, from biology, and from social 
psychology, a moral philosopher can reply that if it is the case that human 
beings have capacities for cooperation, solidarity, and so on, then this will help 
us to understand and cope with some moral issues in some situations, but that 
other meta-ethical tools may be necessary in other situations. For example, 
when dealing with moral choices in a pandemic and reflecting on what moral 
framework to use, one could rely on natural capacities of people for cooper-
ation and solidarity, but if it turns out that this is not enough, it will be nec-
essary to appeal to notions of justice and/or other principles from rationalist 
moral theory. And if such arguments fail to do what they are supposed to do 
(deal with the moral situation), then one should politicize the problem and 
one might question, for example, the ways power is distributed in our society 
and the way we organize democracy. As suggested previously, the proposed 
meta-ethical method thus provides a kind of algorithm for working through 
potential moral frameworks, faced with a specific situation.
Note that taking the next step in the algorithm (or going down the next step 
in the cascade) does not at all mean that the other approaches do not make 
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sense or are useless. Often they remain useful; there is no exclusivity. Usually 
there is a cumulative dynamic at work. If the situation so demands, one may 
have to add the next approach(es). For example, using moral principles does 
not exclude making observations about the moral imagination people use 
to deal with the situation. However, applying the subsidiarity principle means 
that if one does not need another approach to handle the moral problem then 
one stops. For example, if sympathy or imagination were enough to deal with 
problems in animal ethics, then one would not need elaborate moral theories 
of animal rights or deconstructions of the anthropocentrism inherent in our 
traditional moral theories. As it turns out, an account based on sympathy is 
not enough. But in principle one could imagine a situation where a Humean 
approach or, more generally, a naturalist or social approach is entirely satis-
factory to deal with the situation and indeed to understand how people are 
already dealing with the situation, for example when feelings of approval and 
disapproval are sufficient to regulate relationships in a family context, without 
a need for explicit moral reasoning. Similarly, one could imagine that a direct 
political approach can be appropriate in some situations, for instance when 
women are obviously excluded from a morally relevant procedure; an argu-
ment based on rights or an observation about how something is displeasing 
may then be out of place.
Yet often a direct moral response to a situation in terms of sentiments or 
action may already solve the problem. Moral philosophy, understood in the 
strict Kantian rationalist sense as explicit moral reasoning based on rational 
considerations and theories rather than reflection on our feelings and on what 
goes on in naturalistic and social terms, is an emergency aid; if we don’t need it 
we can ignore it. We just have to know it in case, like the safety instructions or 
life vests in an airplane. And if we can do without the deconstructions offered 
by the third approach, why not? The subsidiarity principle is used here as a 
way to keep dealing with moral issues economical. If the problem is solved 
by one approach, then that is all we need. There will sufficient new problems; 
we better save our individual and collective energy for the next one and the 
bigger ones. We just have to learn all the approaches – as moral philosophers 
and as highly developed moral agents in general – in order to be equipped for 
the worst cases. If we are lucky, the natural and social capabilities we already 
have will help us to make some progress, but there is always the risk of failure; 
the rest we have to learn and we have to prepare and be prepared. I use the 
plural “we” because moral problems are faced in a societal context. To use a 
Deweyan term: solving moral problems it is a matter of collective intelligence. 
And it is always a risky business. Neither the situation nor whether we succeed 
is entirely under our control. This is why we need a good multi-layered safety 
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architecture: one that does not rely on one tool but on several, and one that has 
enough “safety nets” or “backup systems”.
Next to responsiveness to experience and the situation, the point that the 
meta-ethical method is guided and governed by a principle that brings order 
in the pluralist architecture is also a way to counter the charge of “anything 
goes” relativism, an objection which is often raised against postmodernism and 
which may also be brought against meta-ethical pluralism. It is not the case 
that “anything goes” when it comes to meta-ethical choices. The demand to 
be responsive to the situation and the application of the subsidiarity principle 
give a preference to some approaches rather than others and put clear method-
ological constraints on their application. If there is a relativism at all, it means 
that the use of moral theory will depend on, and be relative to, the demands 
of the situation – similar to what Dewey proposed with regard to normative 
moral theory but then applied to meta-ethics. And the application of the sub-
sidiarity system is also relative in the sense of “situational”, since whether or 
not the problem can be dealt with sufficiently at one level and by use of one 
theory is itself dependent on the situation and the moral experience in that 
situation. Thus, there is a type of relativism at work, but there is no implication 
that anything goes. I propose a clear methodology that leads to a specific pref-
erence on the basis of a principle that guides and constrains the choice and use 
of moral theory. As said, it is a kind of algorithm that prescribes steps to follow.
Yet it needs to be stressed that, in line with Dewey’s ethics and in contrast 
to some modern ethics, the proposed model is not to be understood as what 
Pappas calls ‘a mechanical decision procedure by which we can solve all prob-
lems. (Pappas 2008, 73) This is why the algorithm metaphor only partly works 
and could potentially be misleading. Whereas in cybernetics the subsidiarity 
principle may well be applied more rigidly, for example in the software archi-
tecture of the controller of a robot, in a meta-ethics inspired by Dewey this 
level of rigidity is out of place. Remaining open to experience means that if 
the demands of the situation change and are such that it is better to start from 
one of the other approaches or from a different, fourth approach altogether, 
then that is fine. Conceiving of this meta-ethical approach as an instrument 
implies that there is always the possibility that there is another, better instru-
ment, or that the instrument can be improved. But I do think that the instru-
ment proposed here can give meta-ethical guidance in many cases. In the end, 
experience will tell. But there is always the possibility of failure. And some 
moral problems may well be tragic, as Pappas has pointed out: often we are 
torn between irreconcilable obligations (92). There is not always a final and sat-
isfying solution. This is not only true for moral decision making but also for 
meta-ethical inquiry. Therefore, meta-ethics must proceed with caution and 
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humility. Anyone applying the model may fail to deal with the problem. And, to 
apply these meta-ethical virtues at an even higher meta-level of analysis: it may 
well turn out that I am wrong about the model I have proposed. The appropriate 
response is then that the tool needs to be refined or that another tool is better.
5 Conclusion: Dirty Morality, Meta-Ethics as Instrument, and the 
Usefulness of the Proposed Methodology for Interdisciplinary 
Moral Philosophy
While the full execution of this project goes beyond the scope of this paper, 
I have at least provided some support for the argument that if we care at all 
about a morality that works, we need not only a pluralist but also a cascading 
(or upwardly progressing) model of morality that involves a subsidiarity hier-
archy for dealing with meta-ethical questions. This constitutes an original and 
novel application of the subsidiarity principle, which is usually applied to social 
and political organization.
Whether it works it practice as a tool for dealing with theory variety and 
indeed for dealing with moral problems, is – as explained – ultimately a matter 
of experimentation and discussion faced with a concrete situation. The model 
also needs further theoretical elaboration. But I have offered some examples 
how it is already working with regard to some specific moral issues and I have 
shown that as a conceptual tool, the model can be developed and justified by 
relying on Deweyan pragmatism and the principle of subsidiarity.
This paper has also argued that the Deweyan understanding of moral the-
ory as a tool also extends to meta-ethics. Perhaps to the horror of Kantians, I 
conclude that meta-ethics itself must be understood as an instrument. It is true 
that meta-ethics is also discourse. And if needed we can move to very abstract 
and even formal levels of analysis. We have the words. We have the discourse. 
We have the language. But the answers we give to the questions what moral-
ity is and what the foundation of morality is should, in the end, be useful. 
Therefore, one could also say: we have the tools. And these tools should be 
geared to the moral experience and situation. From a Deweyan perspective, a 
pure meta-ethics, that is, one that is purified from moral experience and based 
on foundations that are supposed to be entirely external to that moral experi-
ence, is neither possible nor desirable, if not dangerous. If we are to exercise 
our responsibility as moral philosophers, we have a meta-ethical duty to keep 
it dirty.
Understanding meta-ethics as an instrument also enables us to understand 
why a meta-ethics can and must be pluralist. In order to find the right tool for 
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a specific problem, we need experience and we also need a good toolbox, con-
taining not just one but several tools. If not only morality but also meta-ethics 
is a risky business, we are better prepared.
This approach, then, does not only have good arguments for it as a general 
meta-ethical model but is also more likely to succeed when, as moral philoso-
phers, we engage with other disciplines in the natural and/or social sciences and 
even with technological fields such as engineering. Since the pluralist model 
includes naturalist and constructivist directions, it is able to interface with the 
natural and social sciences, and its problem-oriented and situation-oriented 
Deweyan approach to morality fits better with general engineering methodol-
ogy than, say, a Humean psychologizing or a Kantian rationalization of morality.
In addition, and for the same reasons, within philosophy it is also able to 
take on interdisciplinary challenges, for example in dialogue with philosophy 
of science or postmodern philosophies. As most moral philosophers will agree, 
moral philosophy is not supposed to be isolated from other fields within philos-
ophy. The proposed meta-ethical model offers chances to do this.
Now one could rightly argue that with regard such collaborations with other 
fields and with other subfields within philosophy, the subsidiarity principle 
should also be applied: if it can be done within the (sub)discipline, then fine. 
But if not, here is a model that creates some space to do so – space which is 
often hard to find, if not lacking, in non-pluralist meta-ethics. Given the com-
plex problems we are facing a society, my guess is that we will badly need those 
spaces for interdisciplinary normative inquiry. Therefore, we better develop the 
meta-ethical tools that can create these spaces and enable moral philosophers 
and others to operate effectively in them. We need new discourses and new 
toolboxes.
Finally, as moral philosophers employ their meta-ethical tools, they need 
to be aware of the different languages and discourses that are used within the 
relevant approaches and fields, treating them, as it were, as different cultures. 
Without this awareness, it is not possible to carry out the necessary inter-
pretations and translations for a truly pluralistic approach. For example, if, 
in a given situation, I come to understand that a more rational or political 
approach can help to deal with the situation, I may still need to be able to 
understand, interpret, and translate concerns voiced by philosophers arguing 
within a different meta-ethical approach. If I fail to do this, I may not suc-
ceed in solving the situation. Moral problems and meta-ethical problems are 
also in part communication problems. In the real world I have to argue why I 
believe the approach I propose works better and has value in the light of sub-
sidiarity. I have to understand what others mean and I have to try to convince 
them. This argumentative and communicative requirement is true for moral 
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arguments but also for meta-ethical arguments. And this requires that I also 
learn to understand other discourses and to use other tools than the ones I am 
used to because of my particular philosophical training. One of the lessons 
we can learn from both analytic and continental philosophy of language is 
that philosophy, and hence also meta-ethics, is also – but not only – about 
rhetoric, linguistic performances, metaphors, narratives, and so on. As moral 
philosophers, we have to be aware of this and respond critically to their uses – 
a response which itself necessarily takes place within language. Hence lan-
guage-related instruments, too, must part of the toolbox of the interdiscipli-
nary philosophers dealing with meta-ethics. To develop this point, however, is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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